Thinking about the Unthinkable—Unreasonable Exuberance? by Ross, Andrew L.
Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 2 Spring Article 5
2001
Thinking about the Unthinkable—Unreasonable
Exuberance?
Andrew L. Ross
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ross, Andrew L. (2001) "Thinking about the Unthinkable—Unreasonable Exuberance?," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 2 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/5
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
Unreasonable Exuberance?
Andrew L. Ross
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreason-
able one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore
all progress depends on the unreasonable man.
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW
Thinking about the unthinkable just ain’t what it used to be. Such is the ColdWarrior’s lament (that, and not having the Soviet Union to kick around
anymore—after all, Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, and today’s other assorted “states
of concern” are poor replacements for the old bad bear). The Strategic Arms
Reductions Talks (START) process is slowly but thus far surely shrinking the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear-capable bombers have been taken off day-to-day
alert. Land-based and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles have
been “detargeted.” Nuclear modernization has been abandoned in favor of
“stockpile stewardship.” Throw-weight (payload) and circular-error-probable
(accuracy) calculations, and nuclear net assessments more generally, have virtu-
ally fallen by the wayside. Nuclear duty assignments, which the armed forces
once restricted to active-duty personnel, have been
opened to members of the reserves and the National
Guard. Now a retired four-star admiral, writing not
in the pages of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
but in the Naval War College Review, proposes that
the United States needs neither the 3,000–3,500 nu-
clear warheads allowed under START II nor even the
2,000–2,500 warheads envisioned under a prospec-
tive START III, but only two hundred. There is more:
those two hundred warheads, along with the two
hundred nuclear warheads retained by each of the
other seven members of a nuclear “condominium,”
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would be placed in “strategic escrow,” subject to international monitoring and
verification. Implementation of the escrow scheme would, as intended, amount
to the near abolition of nuclear weapons—to the further dismay, no doubt, of
the ghost of General Curtis LeMay, who led the Strategic Air Command in its
glory days.
For Herman Kahn and other classical purveyors of nuclear theology, “think-
ing about the unthinkable” meant thinking about nuclear war.1 Given the cata-
strophic consequences of nuclear war, how could they have avoided thinking
about it? Not to think clearly, rigorously, and systematically about how to de-
ter—and, if necessary, to fight and win—a nuclear war would have been irre-
sponsible. Nuclear weapons and the prospect of their use, however remote,
demanded the attention of defense planners.
Today, ironically, advocates of deep nuclear cuts and even nuclear disarma-
ment can also lay claim to Kahn’s infamous phrase. Thinking about dramatically
reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons constitutes thinking about the un-
thinkable no less certainly than does thinking about fighting and winning
nuclear wars—and it is no less bold. Given the potentially catastrophic conse-
quences of nuclear war, how can we not think about slashing the world’s nuclear
arsenals and perhaps even eventually eliminating them? Not to think clearly,
rigorously, and systematically about whether to reduce and even eradicate nu-
clear weapons would be irresponsible. Serious nuclear arms control (that is, well
beyond START I, II, and III) and nuclear disarmament, however remote their
prospects, now demand the attention of defense planners.
Here and elsewhere, Admiral Stansfield Turner has sided with those who have
challenged the conventional, and original, meaning of “the unthinkable.”2 In-
deed, by endorsing nuclear disarmament as a “desirable goal,” he joins a small
number of prominent retired officers—most notably General Lee Butler (the
first commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command), General John R.
Galvin, General Charles A. Horner, and General Andrew J. Goodpaster—who
have “come out of the closet” to reveal themselves as nuclear abolitionists.3
The admiral’s essay will be greeted coolly by those who have not yet revisited
the meaning of thinking about the unthinkable. His proposal to slash the U.S.
nuclear arsenal to two hundred warheads and place them, along with the war-
heads of the other nuclear powers, in strategic escrow until nuclear abolition is
practical will encounter serious resistance—when it is not simply dismissed or
ignored. The nuclear force–structure implications of the admiral’s implicit as-
sertion that usable strategic forces are composed of conventional rather than
nuclear weapons are sure to be contested by the nuclear priesthood. Too few de-
fense planners share the admiral’s quite explicit concern about the dangers in-
herent in the “conventionalization” of nuclear weapons—the notion that they
R O S S 3 7
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/5
can be used in war as if they were merely more effective conventional weapons.
Even fewer will applaud him for taking the Senate to task for failing to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or for his championing of an Anti–Ballistic Mis-
sile (ABM) Treaty under assault by misguided advocates of national missile de-
fense. “Radical” is one of the more polite terms that will be used to characterize
Admiral Turner’s proposal.
The admiral’s proposed course of action raises questions and poses certain
risks. It would not be difficult to deconstruct his proposal, contest and parse its
assumptions, and dwell at length
on its difficulties and risks. Why,
for instance, has he settled upon
two hundred warheads? Why not
one hundred, or five hundred?
Will the Russian response to a
unilateral American drawdown indeed be governed by reciprocity? How would
the other nuclear states be persuaded to deposit their warheads in an interna-
tionally monitored strategic escrow and establish a condominium of nuclear
powers? Will the rest of the world have confidence in international monitoring
of that nuclear escrow of the UN Security Council’s five permanent members?
Can we expect nonnuclear powers to welcome a nuclear condominium? Would
such a condominium serve only to institutionalize further the divide between
nuclear haves and have-nots? How will its members hedge against a breakdown
of the envisioned regime? Might seemingly prudent hedges in fact contribute to
the regime’s breakdown? How will the conflicting principles underlying a realist
major-power condominium and a liberal international nuclear-monitoring re-
gime be reconciled? Are there other, perhaps more practical, alternatives for
achieving the admiral’s objectives?
Such questions deserve more attention. Details—about the dynamics of a re-
ciprocal nuclear drawdown; the standard operating procedures for a strategic
escrow; the establishment, maintenance, and management of an eight-power
nuclear condominium—matter. Yet the details of the process Admiral Turner
seeks to set in motion should not be allowed to obscure the grand purpose of the
process and its significance. He is on the right track. The stockpiles of nuclear
weapons accumulated during the second half of the twentieth century, particu-
larly by the United States and the former Soviet Union, should be dramatically
reduced, though not yet eliminated. The strategic value of nuclear weapons and
their impact on international security affairs should be minimized. The call for
nuclear marginalization should be heeded.4
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
The centrality of atomic fission and fusion is
giving way to the collection, processing, fusion,
and dissemination of information. Moore’s
Law and Metcalfe’s Law rule.
3
Ross: Thinking about the Unthinkable—Unreasonable Exuberance?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
DEEP REDUCTIONS
For the United States, the costs and risks of dismantling the bulk of its nuclear
arsenal are minimal. The significance of nuclear weapons for the United States
today should not be exaggerated. When the rest of the world looks to the United
States for leadership, it does so because of the full panoply of resources the coun-
try can bring to bear and its continuing commitment to an open, liberal world
order—not because of any specific regard for its nuclear prowess. Nuclear weap-
ons are the linchpin neither of the U.S. position in the world nor of its security.
America’s preeminence, its status as a “full-service” superpower with global dip-
lomatic, economic, and military reach, is not dependent on the size of its nuclear
arsenal. The foundation of U.S. preeminence is a wide array of tangible and in-
tangible (“hard” and “soft”) power resources:5 the world’s benchmark econ-
omy—a strong, dynamic engine that outperforms all others and to which all
seek access; incomparable scientific and technological capabilities; a system of
higher education that is the envy of the world; a growing information, and
knowledge, edge;6 the fundamental soundness of America’s ideas, values, politi-
cal and economic liberalism, and culture—and their nearly universal appeal,
making them the standard against which all others are judged; and finally, but
not least, an overwhelming conventional military superiority. Unilaterally re-
ducing the nuclear arsenal of the United States to a thousand warheads and pur-
suing limited further reciprocal reductions would do little, if anything, to
diminish the nation’s preponderance. Further, it would enhance the credibility
of the U.S. nonproliferation posture.7
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were accorded a central role in U.S.
strategy. In those years they were thought to provide an effective counter to not
only the nuclear capabilities of a rival superpower but the apparent quantitative
conventional superiority of that rival and its allies. The perceived asymmetrical
deterrent and warfighting value of nuclear weapons contributed significantly to
the nuclear buildup rued by Admiral Turner. Notably, extended deterrence,
though not necessarily fundamental deterrence, relied on the idea that the
United States might use nuclear weapons first—even against conventional ag-
gression. The intended message was: These are weapons, like any other, to be
used.
Less is expected of nuclear weapons today. Their role is far less central, if not
yet peripheral. The appropriately residual role for nuclear weapons in U.S. strat-
egy is deterrence of nuclear use.8 That is not a terribly demanding task; it re-
quires primarily that the United States retain a nuclear retaliatory capability that
is secure, credible, and essentially countervalue (i.e., aimed at social and eco-
nomic targets—especially cities—rather than military forces). Such a capability
need not be as large as it is today. The balance of terror, to the extent it still exists,
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is not terribly delicate. Whatever the historical merits of the warfighting ca-
pabilities sought by the nuclear-utility theorists (NUTs) responsible for the
conventionalization of nuclear
weapons rightly denounced by Ad-
miral Turner, there is little require-
ment for such capabilities today.
The minimal requirements pos-
tulated by an assured-destruction
posture can be easily met by a thousand-warhead force.9 There is nothing that
can be deterred with START III’s proposed 2,000–2,500 warheads that cannot be
deterred with one thousand.
As long as nuclear weapons remain in the U.S. inventory, their existential con-
tribution to the deterrence of conventional and biological or chemical warfare
challenges cannot be ruled out. But there is no longer reason to raise explicitly
the specter of a nuclear response to conventional aggression. Whatever the de-
terrent merits of the threat of nuclear escalation in the past, the conventional
challenges existing today do not warrant a nuclear response—and only inexcus-
able complacency by the United States would necessitate one in the future.
Similarly, despite the alleged advantages of a posture of calculated strategic
ambiguity, the threat of overwhelming conventional retaliation should prove an
effective deterrent to the use of biological and chemical weapons. Deterring
attacks by these two kinds of weapons of mass destruction does not necessitate
threats to retaliate with the only kind the United States has not foresworn.
Explicitly leaving the door open for a nuclear response to the use of biological or
chemical weapons places a higher value than necessary on nuclear weapons.
That is the wrong message to convey to nuclear aspirants and others around
the world.
Instead, limitations on the strategic and military utility of nuclear weapons
should be emphasized.10 After all, the flexible strategic power that can actually be
employed to advance and protect American interests resides less in the nation’s
nuclear arsenal than in its overwhelming conventional military superiority. The
impressive U.S. reconnaissance-strike complex—primarily C4ISR*, precision
guided munitions, and defense-suppression systems—on display during DESERT
STORM and ALLIED FORCE is no less strategic, and demonstrably more usable,
than the U.S. nuclear arsenal.11 Continuing improvements in the precision
and lethality of conventional systems promise to erode further the nuclear
stranglehold on things “strategic.” The force-structure implications of this
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transformation were recently captured in the title of an insightful article by
Andrew F. Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak: “Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes.”12
NUCLEAR-FREE VISIONS
In an implicit affirmation of the limited utility of nuclear weapons, joint and
service visions of what is commonly referred to as, variously, the “military after
next” and the “revolution (or less radically, transformation) in military affairs”
are strikingly nuclear-free.13 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their Joint Vision
2020, the key to the “full-spectrum dominance”that is to be provided by “dominant
maneuver,” “precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional
protection” is information, not nuclear, superiority.14 The technologies upon
which the transformation foreseen by U.S. Army statements and concepts like
Army Vision 2010, “Force XXI,” and the “Army after Next” depend include
the likes of global cellular communications, smart pagers, manned and unman-
ned sensors, digitization, artificial intelligence, data compression, stealth, “bril-
liant” munitions, ceramics and
other advanced materials, micro-
and nanoelectronics, electromag-
netic firing systems, robotics, and
directed energy—virtually every-
thing and anything but nuclear
technology. Similarly, the twenty-first-century aerospace force posited by the
U.S. Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board would be built upon breakthroughs
in unmanned combat and reconnaissance aerial vehicles (UCAVs and UAVs);
high-power, short-wavelength lasers; active and infrared stealth; distributed
satellite constellations; automated, reusable space launch vehicles; human-machine
interactions; high-power radio-frequency-attack cruise missiles; and informa-
tion munitions.15
Figuring prominently in the Navy’s vision of network-centric warfare (NCW)
is an expeditionary grid of networked space, air, sea (surface and subsurface),
and ground sensors, weapons, and platforms. This network is to be popu-
lated by the likes of “micro” and “nano” sensors; unmanned aerial and under-
water vehicles (UAVs and UUVs) and UCAVs; and modular surface and
subsurface vessels with, perhaps, virtual command posts. There are to be smart
ships, all-electric ships, and fast ships. “Nuclear” appears to be absent from the
NCW lexicon.16
Similarly, the nine broad technology areas identified by the National Re-
search Council’s Naval Studies Board as forming the naval technology base for
the period 2000 to 2035—computation, information and communications,
sensors, automation, human performance, materials, power and propulsion,
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environments, and enterprise processes—are nuclear-free. The board’s list of
“exciting new technologies” also omits nuclear technology. Its examination of
weapons requirements includes nuclear weapons, but it explores alternatives to
nuclear weapons as well.17
Neither joint nor specifically Army, Air Force, or Navy visions feature nuclear
capabilities. Instead, it is C4ISR that is technologically critical to military
transformation, and at the heart of C4ISR lie information and communications
technologies, both hardware and software. For military visionaries, nuclear
technology is no longer where the action is. The technological future lies in
digitization, intelligent software, and rapid data fusion and display; information
architecture, networks, networks of networks, and systems of systems; band-
width, and computational processing power and speed; sensors; information and
cyber operations; distributed, or virtual, command posts; and self-synchronization
and autonomic systems. Keeping the U.S. military edge requires little exertion
on the nuclear front.18 The nuclear age, it would seem, is being superseded by the
information age (and perhaps also the “nuclear umbrella” by an “information
umbrella”). The centrality of atomic fission and fusion is giving way to the col-
lection, processing, fusion, and dissemination of information. Moore’s Law and
Metcalfe’s Law rule.19
AN UNREASONABLE EXUBERANCE FOR NEAR ABOLITION?
Of course, exuberant military visionaries and proponents of a revolution, or
transformation, in military affairs recognize that nuclear technology will always
be with us. It is, after all, now over fifty years old. They have (intentionally or
not) demoted nuclear technology, taken it off its pedestal, but they have not
abolished it. Nuclear abolition may well be, despite its allure, not only impracti-
cal but undesirable. Dropping to two hundred warheads by 2006, as proposed by
sober critics like Admiral Turner (in his table 2), is problematical as well.
Halving the force envisioned under a START III to a thousand warheads, even
unilaterally, as a prelude to additional limited and reciprocal reductions, is not.20
Relative numbers of nuclear warheads are indeed of little consequence at the
levels attained by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
and maintained by the United States and Russia since. The smaller the arsenals,
however, the more that numbers of warheads are likely to matter. At a thousand
warheads apiece, the United States and Russia would still be essentially immune
to “breakout”—deployment of additional weapons—by the other. Nuclear break-
out could be significant politically, but not militarily. Further, the United States
could be confident of retaining a credible deterrent even if it reduced its arsenal
to a thousand before Russia dropped to that level.
4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Immunity to breakout would seriously deteriorate at levels substantially
below a thousand. Abolition would make the world not only a bit too safe for
conventional war but highly vul-
nerable and sensitive to the covert
deployment of nuclear weapons.
At zero, nuclear breakout would
be enormously consequential, not
only politically but militarily. The
perpetrator would gain an absolute, and usable, military advantage. Given the
potential payoff and the likely uncertainties about the intentions and behavior
of others, the temptation to break out and build even a small nuclear arsenal
would be difficult to resist. This security dilemma would be operative as well at
the way station of two hundred warheads, even assuming strategic escrow. At two
hundred weapons, unlike the situation at a thousand, absolute advantage would
be within reach—or, perhaps more importantly, perceived as being within reach.21
Reduction to two hundred warheads would have the additional disadvantage
of lowering the bar for other actual and potential nuclear states. It is not entirely
clear why the United States, or Russia for that matter, should accept parity with
China, Britain, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan. Also, the potential of achieving
parity with the current members of the nuclear club may only further whet the
appetites of nuclear aspirants around the world. The contribution that deep cuts
in existing nuclear arsenals would make to the cause of nonproliferation should
be exploited, but the restraining influence of abolition or near abolition on nu-
clear ambitions should not be exaggerated.
UNTHINKABLE AND UNREASONABLE?
The contemporary version of the unthinkable—nuclear abolition or near aboli-
tion—should be contemplated no less warily than the original. Deep cuts are
indeed warranted; an American nuclear arsenal of a thousand warheads would
yield the most important advantages of a two-hundred-warhead force without
its disturbing disadvantages. But deep cuts are not enough. They should be
accompanied by a serious arms control agenda in Washington that: reverses the
Senate’s misguided rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; unambigu-
ously supports the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; calls for continued cooper-
ation to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons and to ensure, through
such vehicles as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the safety of Rus-
sian nuclear weapons and fissile materials; formalizes moratoria on the produc-
tion of fissile materials; offers a no-first-use pledge—either an unqualified
no-nuclear-first-use pledge or a no first use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) pledge; maintains space as a sanctuary with respect not only to WMD,
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as provided for by the Outer Space Treaty, but to all weapons; urges a broadening
and deepening of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and declares that the
United States will not unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty. This agenda would
contribute to both Admiral Turner’s objectives and the security component of
an open, liberal international order.
The United States cannot seriously expect others to embrace restraint, nu-
clear or otherwise, if it fails to do so itself. Defense planners are necessarily at-
tuned to the risks that may accompany restraint. Yet at times, to borrow a
marketing slogan employed by a prominent insurance and financial services
group, “The greatest risk is not taking one.”22 Indeed, the risks of not imple-
menting deep nuclear cuts and embracing calculated restraint are greater than
the risks of doing so.
While the argument for deep nuclear cuts is compelling, defense planners will
not rush to embrace Admiral Turner’s nuclear-escrow scheme. They can still,
however, benefit from the counsel of this most “unreasonable” and thoughtful
of men. Such is the source of progress.
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athan Schell, in “The Folly of Arms Control,”
Foreign Affairs, September–October 2000, pp.
22–46, would have us believe, of uncontrolled
proliferation or nuclear abolition. There are
always choices other than “all or nothing.”
21. The precise thresholds above which immu-
nity to breakout exists and below which it
does not are, obviously, difficult to determine.
But at a thousand warheads, we can be confi-
dent of breakout immunity; at two hundred
we cannot.
22. AIG (the American International Group).
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